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Abstract1 
 
This study assesses the ‘drivers’ and ‘breakers’ of Portugal’s participation in the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Given Portugal’s traditionally 
Atlanticist stance, why and how has it supported the ESDP and to what extent, and 
in which particular domains, has Portugal been able to project its preferences in 
security and defence policy onto the European level? I argue that Portuguese 
participation in the ESDP has been motivated by a reactive posture that seeks to 
avoid marginalisation in European affairs through active participation in the inner 
circles of European integration. From a strongly Atlanticist position, Portugal has 
moved towards a willingness to be on the frontline of ESDP. Furthermore, Portugal has 
started to ‘upload’ some of its national security policy preferences, notably with 
regard to Africa, to the European level. However, some ‘breakers’ are visible 
although they do not result from a traditional opposition between Atlanticists and 
Europeanists. Political action has not followed at the same pro-European pace as 
political discourse due to chronic budgetary difficulties and a lack of consensus on 
the direction of Portuguese security policy. Although Portugal is one of the most 
active supporters of European engagement in Africa, this commitment is not 
embraced wholeheartedly as it threatens privileged historical relations. In addition to 
literature and official documents, the research for this paper draws heavily on 
interviews with Portuguese, European and member states’ officials involved either in 




1 The author would like to thank Professor C. D’Aniello for her assistance while writing his 
Master’s thesis, which this paper builds on, as well as all officials who agreed to be 
interviewed.  
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1. Introduction: Fundamentals of Portuguese Security Policy 
 
Se tutto deve rimanere com'è, è necessario che tutto cambi. 
(Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, Il Gattopardo) 
 
For many European countries, participation in the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) is tantamount to significant changes in their security and defence 
policies. For Portugal, it broke a centuries-old tradition of reluctant interventionism in 
European affairs. Portuguese security policy doctrines are to this day ingrained with a 
belief that due to the geographical position of the country more harm than good 
can come from intervening in European affairs. 
Accession to the European Community in 1986 constituted a major turn in Portugal’s 
international outlook. Europe is now as important an element of Portuguese foreign 
policy as the Atlantic dimension or relations with former colonies. And since its 
creation, the ESDP was added as a realm of Portuguese security and defence 
policy. In fact, Portugal "wants to be in the frontline of the establishment of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy, including by participating in the EU military 
missions and in the structured cooperation in the field of defence".2 
However, the path towards fully embracing ESDP has not been carried out without 
some ‘ifs’ and many ‘buts’ as Portugal sided with the most Atlanticist countries that 
were doubtful of a European security policy in the beginning of the 1990s.  
Given Portugal’s traditional Atlanticist stance, why and how has it supported the 
ESDP and to what extent, and in which particular domains, has Portugal been able 
to project its preferences in security and defence policy onto the European level? I 
argue that Portugal’s participation in the ESDP has been motivated by a reactive 
posture that seeks to avoid marginalisation in European affairs through active 
participation in the inner circles of European integration. From a strongly Atlanticist 
position, Portugal has moved towards a willingness to be on the frontline of ESDP. 
Furthermore, Portugal has started to ‘upload’ some of its national preferences in 
terms of security policy, notably with regard to Africa, to the European level. 
However, some breakers are visible although they do not result from a traditional 
opposition between Atlanticists and Europeans. Political action has not followed at 
the same pro-European pace as political discourse due to chronic budgetary 
difficulties and a lack of consensus on the direction of Portuguese security policy. 
Although Portugal is one of the most active supporters of European engagement in 
                                                            
2 Programa do XVII Governo Constitucional, Lisboa, Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, 
2005, p. 159. 
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Africa, this commit-ment is not embraced wholeheartedly as it threatens privileged 
historical relations.  
To better understand the nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
one must be aware of the dynamics between national foreign policies and the 
CFSP/ESDP. This paper applies the concept of Europeanisation to study the inter-
action between ESDP and Portuguese security policy. The added value of the 
Europeanisation approach is that it "attempts to strike a middle path: it accepts that 
member states adapt to CFSP decision-making structures and norms, while at the 
same time recognizing that these same member states are themselves actively 
involved in creating these structures and norms".3 In this regard, Wong defines 
Europeanisation "as a process of change manifested as policy convergence (both 
top-down and sideways) as well as national policies amplified as EU policy (bottom-
up projection)".4  
Portugal is thus ‘European by force’ as it is evident that there has been a process of 
convergence of Portuguese security policy with the ESDP in terms of modernisation of 
the armed forces, political discourse and institutional and bureaucratic changes 
(top-down dimension of Europeanisation). In a broader sense, Portuguese participa-
tion in the ESDP is itself characterised by a reactive posture, that is Portugal has not 
been one of the pioneers in terms of European security and defence but has tried to 
catch up with its partners. However, Portugal has also increasingly become 
‘European by will’, participating in the different cores of European integration such 
as ESDP. Moreover, it has begun to perceive the ESDP as a platform to which it can 
‘upload’ and through which it can pursue specific national interests, as epitomised 
by the Presidencies of the Council of the European Union and by the advocacy of 
an ESDP mission in Guinea-Bissau (bottom-up dimension of Europeanisation). 
The research for this study was conducted mainly through a review of the existing 
literature and documents as well as twenty interviews in spring 2009 with Portuguese, 
other member states’ and European Union officials who are involved either in the 
ESDP or in the Portuguese security policy decision-making.  
I will first look at how Portuguese security and defence policy has adapted to the 
ESDP in terms of modernisation of the armed forces, political discourse, and other 
institutional changes. This adaptation also considers the contributions made by 
Portugal to the ESDP military and civilian capabilities and to its operations and 
missions. Secondly, I will focus on how Portugal has tried to project its own priorities to 
the European level, especially concerning Africa, as exemplified by the ESDP mission 
                                                            
3 Reuben Wong, "Foreign Policy", in Paolo Graziano & Maarten P. Vink (eds.), Europeanization: 
New Research Agendas, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 323. 
4 Wong, op.cit., p. 322. 
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in Guinea-Bissau, and by using the mechanism of the rotating Presidencies of the 
Council of the European Union. 
 
2. The Road to Normality 
When CFSP was first launched in the early 1990s Portugal was part of the Atlanticist 
caucus that regarded suspiciously any security and defence dimension for the EU. 
Throughout that decade, the Portuguese position evolved substantially to supporting 
a gradual integration of the Western European Union in the EU during the 
Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Hence, by the 
time of the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, Portugal had already substantially changed 
its stance regarding an eventual security and defence dimension for the EU. The 
transformations undergone in the security and defence bureaucracies and the 
modernisation of the Portuguese armed forces serve as useful benchmarks for 
assessing the extent to which ESDP is now part of Portuguese security considerations. 
2.1 Portugal’s Adaptation to the ESDP 
2.1.1 Political Discourse and Bureaucratic Adaptations 
The practical development of the ESDP has contributed to softening ‘conceptual 
reluctances’ many member states had. France’s rapprochement with NATO and the 
United States’ more favourable approach to ESDP contributed to that. Yet, Portugal 
maintains reservations about the EU’s role as the provider of European collective 
defence.5  
The Portuguese government has been a strong advocate of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
However, once again, Portugal is very careful about how the permanent structured 
cooperation will take place. Portuguese Director-General of National Defence Policy 
Paulo Vizeu Pinheiro criticised the criteria put forward by the former European 
Defence Agency’s Chief Executive Nick Witney6 as being questionable, but said that 
Portugal should nevertheless "appear in a potential first group of good students".7 
Pinheiro’s statements are important for two reasons. First, they show Portugal’s 
willingness to participate in the permanent structured cooperation, which will 
eventually set out the inner circle of European defence. Second, they display anew 
Portuguese concerns regarding the establishment of ‘directoires’ within ESDP.  
                                                            
5 Interview. 
6 Nick Witney, "Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy", London, European 
Council of Foreign Relations, Policy Paper, 2008. 
7 Paulo Vizeu Pinheiro, "Portugal e a Defesa Europeia", Relações Internacionais, no. 20, 2008, 
p. 148. 
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Some reservations are still expressed in Portugal concerning ESDP. Portuguese military 
sectors remain acculturated to NATO and therefore mistrust the ESDP decision-
making process. However, this favours further development of ESDP. Portuguese 
officers pointed out a need to revise the functioning of the European Union Military 
Committee, since there is no appropriate follow-up of the Chiefs of Defence 
meetings, making ESDP less credible when compared with NATO. The creation of the 
Defence Council of Ministers would be an important step in order to correct such a 
flaw.8 Within the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ESDP belonged since its 
creation to the CFSP directorate headed by the European Correspondent. Before 
the 2007 Portuguese Presidency of the EU, the ESDP desk was integrated in the 
Security and Defence Directorate alongside the NATO and Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation desks.9 
At the moment, the Portuguese delegation to the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) is composed of three diplomats, two military counsellors and one 
representative to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The 
Portuguese Permanent Representative to the PSC has Minister Plenipotentiary rank.10 
The delegation to the PSC is said to have a considerable degree of autonomy and is 
seen as capable of influencing decisions taken in Lisbon since they have direct 
access to information and understand more easily which positions are acceptable to 
the other partners.11 Although the Portuguese Military Representation is double-
hatted and based in NATO Headquarters, the number of personnel dealing with 
ESDP affairs increased in 2009. 
Within the Ministry of Defence, ESDP is dealt with by the Multilateral Relations 
Department of the Directorate-General of National Defence Policy and is said to be 
one of the biggest workloads alongside NATO and Technical-Military Cooperation 
with Portuguese-speaking countries.12 
Inter-ministerial coordination is assured through working groups. The cooperation 
between the two Ministers is said to work rather well. However, there have been 
some issue-specific divergences concerning, for instance, the revision of the Athena 
mechanism’s common costs.13 It is acknowledged that such a revision would make 
Portuguese participation in ESDP missions easier,14 but Portugal has not yet 




10 "Mapa de pessoal da Representação Permanente", Portaria, no. 1128/2008. 
11 Interview. 
12 Interview . 
13 The Athena mechanism finances the common costs of EU operations with military or 
defence implications. ESDP civilian missions are financed directly via the CFSP budget. 
14 Interview. 
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Affairs and the Ministry of Defence hold opposing views. The Ministry of Defence is 
willing to enlarge the common costs of the Athena mechanism, as that would allow 
reducing expenditure under the principle ‘costs lie were they fall’. However, as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs pays the common costs, an increase in the fixed 
contributions would put a heavier burden on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ budget. 
Other divergences concern the creation of the Defence Council of Ministers, to 
which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is opposed because that would mean losing part 
of its control over ESDP, and the launching of the EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
mission in Guinea-Bissau, vis-à-vis which certain officials within the Ministry of Defence 
were initially reluctant.15 
2.1.2 Modernisation of Portuguese Armed Forces 
The 2001 White Book on National Defence states that the modernisation of 
Portuguese Armed Forces should be made in accordance "with the international 
commitments […] to the EU Rapid Reaction Force".16 In this regard, the priorities 
defined were the acquisition of a Multipurpose Logistics Ship (MPL), foreseen for 2005, 
which would allow the transport of battalion-size forces and increase Portugal’s 
sealift capabilities.17 The MPL was given high priority in the revised Military Programm-
ing Law in an effort to obtain the capabilities necessary to be a Battlegroup 
framework nation.18 This was publicly confirmed by the Minister of Defence who 
announced the construction of a 210 million Euro MPL ship with a capacity of 650 
troops.19 
Improvement in airlift tactical capabilities would be achieved by replacing the 
Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules with four Airbus A-400M.20 Portugal also decided to 
participate in the NH-90 helicopter programme although the possibility of leaving the 
programme was considered because of the high costs involved. The decision was 
not taken thanks to the NH-90’s "strong political component related to the 
development of the European defence industry".21 This reasoning, however, was 
reversed by Minister of Defence Portas, who candidly said he was "not available to 
                                                            
15 Interview. 
16 Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional, Lisboa, Ministério da Defesa Nacional, 2001, p. 78. 
17 Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional, op.cit., p. 66. 
18 Interview. ‘Framework nations’ take the operational command of EUBGs and usually 
provide the bulk of the contributions to the Battlegroups. 
19 "Defesa: Ministro garante ‘alta prioridade’ para navio polivalente logístico", Sapo Notícias, 
17/03/2009, http://noticias.sapo.pt/lusa/artigo/9445107.html, retrieved 18 March 2009. 
20 Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional, op.cit., p. 77. 
21 "Estado desperdiça meios com helicópteros das FA", Diário de Notícias, 03/02/06, 
http://dn.sapo.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=635355, retrieved 21 April 2009. 
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pay for political or label prices".22 In 2002 Portugal quit the Airbus A-400M project in 
exchange for the US-made Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules. The Portuguese 
Government considers returning to the A-400M project a “strategic objective” and 
has taken other decisions with the European factor in mind, as the recent acquisition 
of 12 C-295M aircraft made by EADS-CASA, a leading European aircraft producer 
and party to the Airbus A-400M project, demonstrates.23 
The development of a competitive European defence market has always been 
advocated by Portugal as a crucial step towards a more effective ESDP. For 
instance, Portugal considered one of the major flaws of the Amsterdam Treaty to be 
the fact that no step had been taken concerning the (lack of) competitiveness of 
European defence industries.24 Portugal thus wholeheartedly supported the creation 
of the European Defence Agency (EDA) which it considered "of paramount 
importance to drive up the military capabilities of the EU".25 On the other hand, 
Portugal is one of the main European defence equipment importers and 
participation in the EDA could lead to the disappearance of feeble national 
defence industries. In reaction, Portuguese governments have supported an 
allowance of "room for small and medium enterprises and for specific national 
defence industries to be brought in".26  
In 2007 defence expenditure totalled 1,48% of Portuguese GDP, below the 1,69% EU 
average and a 2% decrease from 2006.27 Investment in equipment procurement and 
R&D almost doubled, but still represented only 12% of the total defence expenditure 
against the 20% average of the EU. In 2007, Portugal spent 22,8 million Euro in 
collaborative defence equipment projects or programmes, of which 22,7 million Euro 
were for European projects. Only 8% of Portugal’s total equipment procurement is 
European, but this was a substantial increase compared to 2006 (0,2%). 
                                                            
22 Paulo Portas, "Discurso do Ministro de Estado e da Defesa Nacional no Seminário de 
Encerramento da Euro Defense", 26/09/2002, p. 13, http://www.mdn.gov.pt/NR/rdonlyres/ 
C94DD074-9878-4B5E-8591-8954B3719FEE/0/26092002_Discurso_MDN_Encerramento_ 
EURODEF.pdf, retrieved 21 April 2009. 
23 Interview. 
24 Francisco Seixas da Costa, "O Tratado de Amesterdão e a Segurança Comum Europeia", 
Europa: Novas Fronteiras, no. 3, 1998, p. 17. 
25 Manuel Lobo Antunes, "The Portuguese Perspectives on the Evolution of European Security 
and Defence Policy and the Portuguese and European Defence Industries", 01/07/05, 
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/Portal/PT/Governos/Governos_Constitucionais/GC17/Ministerios/
MDN/Comunicacao/Intervencoes/20050701_MDN_Int_SEDNAM_PESD.htm, retrieved 22 April 
2009. 
26 Ibid. 
27 All data in this paragraph are taken from European Defence Agency, "Defence Data of 
EDA Participating Member States in 2007", Brussels, European Defence Agency, 2008. 
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Within the EDA, Portugal subscribes to the Code of Conduct on Defence Procure-
ment and participates in the following programmes and projects:28  
•  Development Capabilities Plan in all the Integrated Development Teams and 
in the following Project Teams: Software Defined Radio, Chemical Biological 
Radiological and Nuclear Explosives Ordnance Disposal, 21st Century Soldier 
Systems, Maritime Surveillance, European Air Transport Fleet (EATF); 29 
•  Three EDA strategies (Defence, Technological and Industrial Base, Research 
and Technology, and Armaments Cooperation); 
•  Category A projects: Joint Investment Programme on Force Protection; 
•  Category B projects: Maritime Mines Counter Measures and Future Unmanned 
Aerial Systems. 
Portugal has also participated in strategic transport international cooperation 
systems such as the Strategic Air Lift Interim Solution and the Multinational Imple-
menting Arrangements. Portugal is considering rejoining the latter and joining the 
Eindhoven-based Movement Coordination Centre Europe and the Athens Multi-
national Sealift Coordination Centre.30 It is supportive of and involved in the 
European Union aircraft carrier group (a French proposal) and in the military Erasmus 
programme, even organising the first tentative course on ESDP for students of 
different European military academies.31  
Member states contribute military and civilian capabilities voluntarily to achieve the 
ESDP objectives. Below I will analyse the contributions made by Portugal to the 
military and civilian Headlines Goals and to the more than twenty ESDP missions and 
operations launched so far. 
2.2 Portugal’s Contributions to the ESDP  
2.2.1 Military and Civilian Capabilities 
Following the adoption of the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG), the Portuguese 
contributions to the HHG were considered "relatively low" but "sufficient to signal the 
country’s political interest in remaining inside the process".32 Portugal committed 2,2% 
of its active military forces for the HHG, whereas the average contribution of member 
                                                            
28 Pinheiro, op.cit., p. 20, and "EDA Bulletin", European Defence Agency, no. 10, February 
2009. 
29 The EATF was supposed to pool only A-400M aircrafts, but in order to allow the participation 
of countries that are not participating in the Airbus grouping, the project was extended to 
also include C-130 aircrafts. Interview. 
30 Pinheiro, op.cit., pp. 20-21. 
31 Interview. 
32 Laura Ferreira-Pereira, "Between Scylla and Charybdis: Assessing Portugal’s Approach to 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy", Journal of European Integration, vol. 29, no. 2, 
2007, p. 220. 
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states was 5,1%. “In terms of the proportion of active forces pledged […] Portugal, 
Greece and Italy were at the bottom.”33 A more significant contribution was 
hampered by budgetary restrictions and by the lack of appropriate military 
capabilities.  
In 2004, the Council of the European Union approved the Headline Goal 2010, which 
shifted the focus to high readiness multinational Battlegroups designed for out-of-
area operations.34 Then Minister of Defence Luís Amado stated, "[t]he ambiguous 
relation with the structured cooperation and its potential of variable geometry make 
participation in the Battlegroups politically and militarily impossible to refuse".35 The 
Portuguese contribution was made to a multinational Battlegroup (Spain, Italy, 
Portugal and Greece - EUABG) based on the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) 
that was on stand-by during the first half of 2006.36 Portugal was able to participate in 
this first rotation with only one military staff officer.37 This Battlegroup has a clear 
Mediterranean scope, though one might expect Portugal to participate in a 
Battlegroup with a more Atlanticist focus. Portugal indeed tried to participate in a 
Battlegroup with the United Kingdom, which declined.38 Portugal also participated 
with an Engineering Company comprising 120 troops in another Battlegroup next to 
Spain (framework nation), France and Germany that was on stand-by during the first 
half of 2008.39  
The EUABG was on stand-by for a second time in the first half of 2009. Portugal 
contributed one Marines’ Company. A more substantial participation was hampered 
by the lack of a Landing Platform Dock vessel.40 In December 2008, France, Belgium, 
Spain, Finland and other member states argued that the European Union could 
deploy its Battlegroups in eastern Congo's Nord-Kivu province. The UK and Germany, 
with Battlegroups on stand-by, opposed, as did Portugal, which participated in the 
SIAF-based Battlegroup on stand-by from January 2009 due to domestic political 
concerns (three elections scheduled in 2009).41 But Portugal also believes that the 
                                                            
33 Bastian Giegerich & William Wallace, "Not Such a Soft Power: the External Deployment of 
European Forces", Survival, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 173-174. 
34 Council of the European Union, "Headline Goal 2010", Brussels, 17 May 2004. 
35 Luís Amado, "Intervenção do Ministro da Defesa Nacional no Seminário Internacional sobre 
Defesa Europeia", 06/04/05, http://www.portugal.gov.pt/Portal/Print.aspx?guid={AA7ECF7B-
1662-441C-B59F-4731FC5D0C39}, retrieved 22 April 2009. 
36 Council of the European Union, "Military Capability Commitment Conference", Brussels, 24 
November 2004. 
37 Nuno Pereira da Silva, "Actualização da Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa", Revista 
Militar, 26/11/08, http://www.revistamilitar.pt/modules/articles/article.php?id=281, retrieved 
20 April 2008. 
38 Interview. 
39 Laura Ferreira-Pereira, "Portugal and ESDP", in Klaus Brümmer (ed.), The South and ESDP, 
Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007, p. 40. 
40 Silva, ‘Actualização da Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa’, op.cit. 
41 Interview. 
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utilisation of the EU Battlegroups "must not be pushed" and that the defined criteria 
for their utilisation "must be strictly respected".42  
Courela claims that "Portugal has been contemplating the creation of a Luso-
Spanish land-forces Battlegroup".43 My research found opposite conclusions: a land-
forces Battlegroup between Portugal and Spain would involve a very high-level of 
military integration that is not yet acceptable at the political level.44 Furthermore, 
Portugal prefers Battlegroups with at least three countries to balance Spain’s possible 
predominance: "it would prevent us from having to deploy the Battlegroup in places 
that have no interest for us".45 
Portugal is trying to obtain the required capabilities to be a Battlegroup framework 
nation.46 It is more likely, however, that Portugal will be the lead nation of a future EU 
Battlegroup based on the EUROFOR, in which France, Italy, Spain and Portugal 
participate. Portugal will have the rotating command of EUROFOR in 2011 and has 
proposed making it available to the European Union as a Battlegroup.47 This would 
mean a significant increase in the Portuguese contribution to the Battlegroups since 
the unit on-call to the EUROFOR is the Rapid Reaction Brigade, "the light force with 
the highest readiness of the Portuguese Army", previously deployed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor.48 Portuguese officials also consider that a 
possible EUROFOR-based Battlegroup can be a model for future Battlegroups since it 
is founded upon a new concept of permanent forces allocated to the EU for 
particular periods of time. 49 
The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) intends to provide the EU with the 
necessary capabilities to conduct civilian crisis management operations, in four main 
areas: Police, Rule of Law, Civilian Administration and Civil Protection. Portugal has 
defined the following civilian capabilities to be put at the EU’s disposal: 50 
•  350 police officers, mostly Public Security Police and gendarmes, but also 17 
Judicial Police agents; 
                                                            
42 Interview. 
43 Pedro Courela, "CFSP Watch 2005 – Portugal", FORNET, CFSP Watch Annual Reports, 2005, p. 
6, http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2005/CFSP%20Watch%202005%20Portugal.pdf, 





48 "Eurofor – Portuguese Contribution", EUROFOR, http://www.eurofor.it/unit_on%20call.htm, 
retrieved 22 April 2009. 
49 Interview. 
50 J o ã o  M i r a  G o m e s ,  " I n t e r v e n ç ã o  d o  S e c r e t á r i o  d e  E s t a d o  d a  D e f e s a  N a c i o n a l  e  d o s  
Assuntos do Mar no almoço palestra A Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa", 23/09/07, 
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/Portal/Print.aspx?guid={FF89E6C8-AA77-45A9-B56D-
09BC23CA8511}, retrieved 24 April 2009. 
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•  8 experts for rule of law missions; 
•  4 experts for civilian administration tasks; 
•  104 personnel for civil protection tasks. 
Portugal seems to have difficulties concerning the civilian dimension of ESDP. This 
lack of adaptation is not a specific Portuguese problem but is general to the ESDP 
civilian crisis management since it relies on experts and bureaucracies (ministries of 
Justice and of the Interior) whose priorities are not the same as those of the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, and on experts who do not have a tradition of 
being deployed abroad.  51 A civilian crisis management course was recently 
launched by the Ministry of Defence in order to train experts in this field. 
Portugal is one of the main European contributors in the field of police capabilities. In 
view of the realisation of the CHG 2008 target for police forces, the gendarmeries of 
France, Italy, Spain and Portugal launched a joint initiative "to enhance coordination 
and information exchange between these institutions, […] to provide a basis for the 
creation of the EU police rapid reaction force".52 The forces from these four countries 
make up almost 25% of the 5,000 police forces defined in the CHG 2008. 53 Portugal is 
also one of the countries participating in the European Gendarmerie Force, 
constituted by France, Italy, Spain, Romania, the Netherlands and Portugal, capable 
of deploying 800 people within 30 days.  
2.2.2 Participation in ESDP Missions and Operations 
Portugal participated timidly in the first ESDP military operations. In 2003 Lisbon 
committed six personnel to Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and one military staff officer for Operation Artemis in the DR Congo.54 A 
general reason accounting for this could have been the high number of troops 
deployed abroad in 2002 and 2003. 
Concerning Operation Artemis, various explanatory factors have been pointed out 
for Portugal’s non-participation on the ground. First of all, this was a quasi-French 
operation done at the European level, where the force generation process was 
almost inexistent. Secondly, the Portuguese military establishment is said to have 
mistrusted ‘the scope and aims’ of this first EU out-of-area military operation.55 
Similarly, the fact that this was a peacemaking operation also contributed to 
                                                            
51 Interview. 
52 Derek Lutterbeck, "Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of 
Gendarmeries", Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 39, no. 1, 2004, p. 61. 
53 Renata Dwan, "Civilian Tasks and Capabilities in EU Operations", in Marlies Glasius & Mary 
Kaldors (eds.), A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Projects, Principles and Practicalities, 
London, Routledge, 2005, p. 270. 
54 Ferreira-Pereira, "Portugal and ESDP", op.cit., p. 42, and Interview. 
55 Ferreira-Pereira, "Portugal and ESDP", op.cit., p. 42. 
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Portugal’s unwillingness to participate.56 A third possible reason was Angola’s 
démarche to the Portuguese Government stating they would prefer Portugal not to 
intervene in the region.57 
In EUFOR Althea Portugal decided to sustain the 246-troop contingent and the Force 
Commander that had already been engaged in SFOR. Portugal’s contribution has 
been progressively reduced in accordance with the evolution of the mission but 
accounted in 2006 for 8,5% of the European total.58 Another reason for Portugal’s 
engagement in Althea is the fact that it was the first ‘Berlin plus’ operation, therefore 
testing the complementarity between the EU and NATO.59 
Portugal participated in 2006 in EUFOR RD Congo with 33 marines comprising a 
special operations unit and a C-130 aircraft with 17 air force personnel.60 The 
Portuguese role in force projection has been praised by some "as a very important 
contribution for the success of the operation",61 but others consider that the 
Portuguese contribution was not substantial.62 Apparently, familiarity with Africa 
played a role in Portuguese participation in this mission, as Germany asked Portugal 
to participate prior to Berlin’s final decision to commit forces.63 
EUFOR Chad/RCA – launched in 2008 – was planned during the Portuguese EU 
Presidency of 2007. Portugal contributed two military staff personnel and one C-130 
aircraft that in two months carried out 70% of the total strategic airlift of the mission.64 
According to the Portuguese Minister of Defence: 
Portugal, while holding the Presidency of the European Union, did everything to push 
for the concretisation of a military mission within the framework of ESDP to support the 
UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic […] Portugal wants to be in the 
frontline of the foreign, security and defence policy of the European Union. Portugal 
participated in all the European military missions and had to do so in EUFOR Chad-
RCA, the fourth and biggest military operation of the European Union.65 
Portugal also made symbolic contributions to the EU operations in Sudan in support 
of Amis II and to EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Portugal has thus participated in all the EU 
military missions, although with not very substantive contributions in terms of numbers. 
Some conclusions can be drawn from this picture. First, Portugal demonstrates 
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willingness to be involved with the ESDP process and to be seen by its partners as an 
active contributor. Second, low contributions can be explained by some problems in 
terms of national decision-making as regards force generation for ESDP operations. 
This process takes too long for European requirements due to inadequate structures 
at the military level.66 P o r t u g a l  i s  t r y i n g  t o  a d d r e s s  s o m e  o f  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  b y  
creating a new national financing mechanism.67 Third, Portugal has opted to provide 
strategic airlift capabilities, an instrumental part of out-of-area operations, in which 
the EU has some deficiencies. Fourth, the biggest contribution Portugal has made 
thus far concerns the Althea operation, conducted in a theatre of operations that 
only recently became part of Portuguese security interests. Despite Africa’s 
importance in Portuguese foreign and security policy, the relatively small Portuguese 
participation with troops on the ground may result from the fact that Portugal is 
suspicious at a gendarme’s role in Africa.68 There seems to exist a clear preference 
for conflict prevention in Africa, including through ESDP civilian missions rather than 
an involvement in military crisis management operations. Finally, although the 
Portuguese Defence Minister stated that a balance should be sought between 
Portuguese contributions to NATO and EU operations,69 NATO operations, being more 
muscled, receive bigger contributions: KFOR, SNMG-1 and ISAF account for around 
600 of the roughly 750 Portuguese troops deployed abroad in 2009.  
Considering all the military operations of the EU (excluding EU NAVFOR Atalanta), 
Portugal has deployed 313 troops representing a total effort of 11,34 per thousand. 
These figures rank Portugal as the ninth contributor in absolute terms and the eighth 
in relative terms for ESDP military operations.70 The recognition that Portugal is 
reluctant to place all the bets in Europe is implicitly made when the Director of 
National Defence Policy states that in the eventuality of defining criteria for 
permanent structured cooperation the national contributions to other organisations 
have to be considered.71 
Concerning ESDP civilian missions, Portugal contributed to all operations except 
EUPOL Afghanistan, AMM Monitoring Mission in Aceh, EUPAT FYROM and EUJUST 
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THEMIS Georgia.72 Portugal sent 33 police officers to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia 
and two police officers to Operation Proxima in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. Portugal participates with three people of the Borders and Foreigners’ 
Office in EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova, and with one diplomat (political counsellor of the 
Head of Mission) and three gendarmes in EUBAM Rafah. Concerning the rule of law 
missons, in EUJUST LEX Iraq Portugal has participated with four personnel and 
organised a criminal investigation course for Iraqi judicial agents.73 In the other 
missions Portugal has made little more than symbolic contributions: one person to 
EUMM Georgia and two each to EUPOL COPPS and to EULEX Kosovo. 
Portuguese engagement in the EU civilian missions conducted in Africa is much more 
significant. In EUPOL Kinshasa Portugal participated with 12 police officers, including 
the Head of Mission,74 which made up 15% of the total contributions to this mission. 18 
Portuguese police officers have participated in its successor EUPOL RD Congo, which 
is the second largest contribution (30% of the total), and the Portuguese Head of 
Mission was reappointed. For the EUSEC RD Congo mission, 7 experts have been 
provided. In EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, 11 out of the 19 initial members of the mission were 
Portuguese. 
In terms of police missions, Portugal has been one of the pioneers and has made 
significant contributions to the two police missions in RD Congo. In both ESDP civilian 
and military operations there seems to be a particular interest in those conducted in 
Africa; Portugal has so far participated in all the ESDP missions carried out on that 
continent. However, it seems to have adopted a different strategy in what concerns 
participation in military and civilian missions. For the former, Portugal has tried to 
participate no matter what the scope or the location of the mission were, while in 
the case of civilian missions much more significant contributions have been made to 
those conducted in Africa. This is further stressed by the fact that, despite being the 
eleventh absolute contributor to ESDP civilian missions, Portugal is the fifth country 
with bigger average shares considering only the missions where it actually 
participated (7,1% of the personnel deployed).75 
As I have shown, ESDP has had a substantial impact on Portuguese security policy by 
generating changes in the political discourse and bureaucracies. The modernisation 
of Portuguese Armed Forces now proceeds with the European factor in mind, and 
the contributions given by Portugal to the EU military and civilian operations have 
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been significant. Moreover, in the path towards fully embracing ESDP, Portugal has 
also started to ‘upload’ some of its interest onto the European level. 
 
3. Speaking European but Thinking Portuguese? 
In the literature on the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, the EU is often 
said to be used as a veil by member states to promote their own interests. This is 
usually done in order to surmount political (accusations of neo-colonialism) or 
financial (by sharing the costs with the EU and other member states) difficulties. 
Portugal has purposefully started to use the EU with this same reasoning in mind by 
promoting an ESDP mission in Guinea-Bissau and by using the Presidencies of the 
Council to promote its preferences and harvest eventual long-run benefits. 
3.1 Mixed Feelings About Africa 
3.1.1 Portuguese Africa Policy at the EU Level 
Portuguese bilateral relations with its five former African colonies constitute one of 
the most important vectors of Portuguese foreign policy. In terms of security and 
defence, relations are conducted bilaterally through Technical-Military Cooperation 
Agreements and multilaterally at the level of the Community of Portuguese-speaking 
Countries (CPLP). 
The ESDP has shown a considerable focus on Africa by conducting three military 
operations and four civilian missions in Africa thus far. In addition, the EU supports the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This support is very complex and is 
further complicated by the programmes led by EU member states.76 In this regard, 
Portugal conducts the already mentioned Technical-Military Cooperation pro-
grammes and launched within CPLP the Support Programme to Peacekeeping 
Missions in Africa (PAMPA). These programmes are seen as valuable for Portuguese 
security policy but also as an important asset to Portuguese foreign policy as a 
means of preserving Portugal’s influence in those countries. According to a report of 
the French prime minister’s Centre d’analyse stratégique, "Portugal would like its 
programmes to be integrated in the EU training policy, but does not want all of its 
programmes to be Europeanised".77 Portugal is considered one of the four European 
member states – alongside France, the UK and Belgium – that "can be considered to 
have a real African policy".78 
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There is a clear gap between Portuguese political discourse and practice 
concerning the European support to African capabilities. There seem to exist two 
main perspectives: "a conservative one, which considers that cooperation at the EU 
level is harmful for bilateral relations; and a pragmatic one, which understands that 
European multilateral cooperation is already out there".79 A Portuguese absence 
would mean losing any type of privileged relationship: "either we are in or we are 
out. Angola is in the African Stand-by Force. If we do not participate in the European 
initiatives they will end up being trained by the French".80 I n  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  i t  i s  
Portugal’s objective to be a ‘leading country’ in AMANI AFRICA and to be able to 
Europeanise one of the CPLP centres of excellence for the next AMANI AFRICA 
cycle.81 
However, other sectors of Portuguese security policy are critical of the EU 
programmes based on the French RECAMP (‘Renforcement des capacités africaines 
au maintien de la paix’). They argue that Portugal should focus on bilateral 
cooperation with the Portuguese speaking countries, on multilateral initiatives within 
the CPLP and on bilateral cooperation with Brazil and the United States. The idea of 
Europeanising the CPLP centres is particularly resented.82 On the diplomatic side, it is 
acknowledged that the Europeanisation of the Portuguese programmes would carry 
some risks in terms of losing direct control of those programmes. For these reasons, 
Portugal is trying to fund some of its programmes through the EU without fully 
Europeanising them.83 Although it is supportive of the concept, Portugal thinks "it is 
not yet able to give to AMANI what we do at the CPLP level".84 
Portugal participates in the EURO RECAMP - AMANI AFRICA but does not have a 
leading role in spite of its declared ambitions. For instance, Portugal is not part of the 
international team implementing the EURO RECAMP - AMANI AFRICA 2008-2010 
cycle that involves representatives from France, the UK, Belgium and Italy.85 Portugal 
was supportive of the AMANI - AFRICA concept but "diverged from the French 
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3.1.2 The Case of EUSSR Guinea-Bissau 
EUSEC DR Congo, focusing on security sector reform, attracted particular Portuguese 
attention because it was considered that similar actions could be promoted "to the 
benefit of the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa".87 The PAMPA, launched in 
2006, already foresaw that Portugal would "actively continue to make efforts towards 
the consolidation of EU security sector reform policies in Africa, in view of the 
potential selection of Guinea-Bissau".88 The November 2007 European Council 
meeting, under the Portuguese Presidency, "considered that an ESDP action in the 
field of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau would be appropriate".89 Later, the 
Council decided to launch a civilian ESDP mission to "provide local authorities with 
advice and assistance on SSR in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau".90 
All my interviewees agreed that Portugal played a very active role in launching this 
mission. For some, "all the presidencies like to launch an ESDP mission",91 but this was 
also a "pragmatic choice for the European level" combined with a willingness in 
promoting the African Portuguese-speaking countries within the EU.92 Support for this 
mission was also motivated by the understanding that Portugal did not have all the 
necessary resources to conduct the mission by itself, or at least that the cost would 
be considerably lower if conducted at the European level.93 Similarly, conducting 
such a mission under a European veil lessens some political problems that could arise 
with Guinea-Bissau if the mission were conducted bilaterally.94  It also contributes to 
call the international community’s attention to a country that has been neglected.95 
Portugal would have preferred a military mission because the Guinean armed forces 
are the main political actor and problem, playing a decisive role in the country’s 
political life. For this reason Portugal supported as Head of Mission a Spanish 
General.96 Other countries, however, consider that SSR missions are inherently civilian 
or that the mission should have a comprehensive approach.97 The appointment of a 
Spanish Head of Mission was ill-regarded by the Portuguese Armed Forces, who 
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considered that Portugal was giving away its privileged relationship with Bissau.98 For 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was important that this mission "was not seen as a 
Portuguese mission".99 Furthermore, Portugal already has one Head of Mission and it 
would have been politically difficult to have another. By ensuring that the post of 
Deputy Head of Mission would go to a Portuguese national and that most of the 
experts on the ground were Portuguese, Portugal acquired an important ‘soft 
direction’ of the mission.100 
The launching of the mission was not consensual among member states due to 
budgetary constraints and because it was not deemed a common European 
interest.101 Italy was opposed to its launching because it was interested in promoting 
its own African agenda that focuses on the Horn of Africa.102 France was not very 
enthusiastic either but gave Portugal its support based on a trade-off involving 
Portugal’s contribution for the preparation of EUFOR Chad/RCA under the 
Portuguese Presidency. According to one author, the French idea of an ESDP 
operation in Chad “was clearly no priority, but the incoming Portuguese presidency 
put the proposal back on the agenda”.103 For Portugal, having the other countries’ 
support was seen as possible only thanks to the “enthusiastic” Portuguese 
participation in ESDP.104 
Thus, as a result of "the difficulty to find a common ground between member states 
in view of undertaking ambitious actions in Africa", which was especially evident in 
the case of EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, the ESDP mission is very "limited in personnel and 
tasks to perform" and "no operational activities are included in the mandate".105 In 
consequence, a significant Portuguese contribution in terms of personnel was 
instrumental to the conduct of the mission thanks to its knowledge of the country and 
also because only five other member states contributed personnel: as many as 11 
Portuguese experts (out of a total of 19) have been seconded to the mission. Finally, 
Portugal’s contribution matches the country’s political engagement with the mission 
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Portugal also pushed for the continuation of the one-year mandate of the mission106 
that was extended until November 2009. It remains to be decided whether the EU will 
also participate in the implementation phase of the National SSR. In fall 2009 it is not 
clear whether the EU will continue to be involved on the ground with an ESDP 
mission. Some member states have lost their interest because it is a small mission 
without a pressing European interest at stake, but Portugal has worked for "Guinea-
Bissau to stay on the European radar"107 and recent developments in the region 
might lead to a redefinition of the EU’s role in West Africa. The political instability in 
Guinea-Bissau and the EU’s reaction to it also cast doubts on the EU’s engagement in 
Guinea-Bissau. Portugal was the only country that became politically engaged while 
"[t]he EU’s reaction was almost inexistent as member states did not decide to re-
evaluate their engagement in this country, leaving the mission even weaker than 
before".108 
Thanks to the privileged position occupied during six months, the Presidencies of the 
Council are used by member states to promote national preferences while trying at 
the same time to have as successful a Presidency as possible. Since the ESDP was 
launched, Portugal held the Presidency of the Council twice. In 2000, the ESDP was 
still in an embryonic phase, while in 2007 it was already fully operational and many 
institutions had been created in the meantime. 
3.2 Making Use of the Presidency 
3.2.1 The 2000 Portuguese Presidency 
Portugal held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 
2000, right after the ESDP had officially been conceived during the June 2000 
Cologne European Council. At the same time, Portugal held the Presidency of the 
Western European Union (WEU) and was "able to maintain the rapid momentum that 
had been built-up since the Franco-British declaration at Saint-Malo in December 
1998".109 The Portuguese Presidency of the WEU focused on the organisation’s 
progressive integration into the EU.110 
Following the Helsinki and Cologne European Councils, the Portuguese Presidency of 
2000 was commissioned to advance a number of tasks towards the consolidation of 
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ESDP and to present a Progress Report of the HHG at the Feira European Council of 
2000. Therefore, some ESDP landmark decisions were taken during the Portuguese 
Presidency that resulted from timetables defined beforehand.111 Nevertheless, during 
the Portuguese Presidency six main steps were developed towards fulfilling the HHG:  
[D]efining the strategic context for EU operations; formulating the key assumptions to 
guide operational planning; selecting more adequate scenarios for the employment 
of forces and identifying force capabilities needed for the selected scenarios; 
developing force packages endowed with capabilities and readiness needed to 
intervene in selected scenarios; and utilising the force packages to define the total 
scope of requirements underlying the HHG.112  
These tasks were preceded by the implementation of the interim ESDP structures like 
the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military 
Staff.113 To fulfil the tasks it had been mandated, Portugal worked closely with the 
interim ESDP structures. In Brussels, the military representatives were reinforced. In 
Lisbon an ESDP task force was established within the Portuguese Military Staff with 
financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.114 
Under Portuguese chairmanship of the interim EU Military Committee a methodology 
to achieve the HHG was defined, which was translated to the Capabilities 
Development Mechanism.115 Furthermore, a timetable was set out scheduling for 
late 2000 a Capabilities Commitment Conference.116 The then Portuguese Chief of 
Defence was presented as a possible candidate for Chairman of the EUMC. Despite 
support from some member states, notably France, the Portuguese candidacy was 
withdrawn due to lack of real political interest.117 
The steps taken towards operationalising the ESDP politico-military structures were 
considered by the Portuguese Foreign Minister as a "conceptual breakthrough" that 
represented "the foundation of a real operational capacity, supported by the 
necessary instruments to enable the Union to take autonomous action in military and 
non-military crisis management".118 However, one of the main concerns of the 
Portuguese Presidency was the EU-NATO relationship and "keeping Washington and 
Ottawa informed and on board",119 by "stressing the mutually reinforcing effect of 
European defence and NATO and the practical aspects of the relations between 
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the European Union and NATO".120 In this context, modes of consultation with non-EU 
NATO members were arranged. At the Feira European Council the creation of four 
ad hoc working groups between the EU and NATO were proposed: security issues, 
capability goals, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, and 
the definition of permanent arrangements for NATO-EU consultation.121 
Another important innovation of the Portuguese Presidency concerned the civilian 
aspects of crisis management, the importance of which had been stressed in the 
Helsinki European Council. As a result, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management was set up in May/June 2000 and a Council-Commission coordination 
mechanism was established. Furthermore, a seminar was held in Lisbon in order to 
define capabilities needed in the area of civilian crisis management. A specific 
target for EU police capabilities was set in the member states in order to provide, by 
2003, 5,000 police officers, one thousand of which deployable within 30 days.122 
According to the then Portuguese Foreign Minister, Portugal’s particular experience 
in police missions abroad was a major factor in stressing the need for a police 
component for conflict prevention and crisis management missions and accounted 
for the early definition of a specific target for police capabilities in the Feira 
European Council.123 Some authors consider that the Portuguese interest in 
promoting the civilian dimension of ESDP derived from the possibility that such 
missions could be undertaken "in the context of missions of national reconciliation 
and national reconstruction in former Portuguese Africa".124 
The ESDP, because of its recent launch and political importance, constituted a 
crucial part of the exercise of the Portuguese Presidency and contributed to a first 
intensive contact of the military establishment with the brand-new ESDP.125 Seven 
years later, Portugal held the Presidency of the Council with a significantly 
transformed ESDP landscape. Several bodies had been created in the ESDP realm 
and many military and civilian missions had been deployed. 
3.2.2 The 2007 Portuguese Presidency  
In order to conduct the Presidency in the area of ESDP, a working group was created 
within the Ministry of Defence chaired by the Director of National Defence Policy. 
The Portuguese Military Representative in Brussels was also reinforced with two extra 
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officers.126 Preceding the Presidency, the Minister of Defence had diplomatic 
contacts with EU member states, African capitals (mainly Luanda and Kinshasa) and 
the countries of the ‘5+5 dialogue’,127 as well as with the High Representative Solana 
and with the Secretary-General of NATO. Among the EU countries, the Minister met 
with its German and Slovenian counterparts (members of the Troika) but also with the 
Ministers of Defence of the UK, France and Spain,128 which is symptomatic of 
Portuguese diplomatic relations within the ESDP. 
One of the tasks of any Presidency is completing the mandate received from the 
previous presidencies. Concerning the development of EU military capabilities, the 
Progress Catalogue 2007 was approved and it was considered that a new 
capabilities planning process was not required. Concerning the civilian dimension, 
the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was successfully concluded under the Portuguese 
Presidency and a new Civilian Headline Goal for 2010 was presented. The Civilian 
Planning and Conduct Capability, responsible for the overall supervision of the ESDP 
civilian crisis management missions, was established within the Council Secretariat.129 
At the ESDP level, Portugal defined as specific priorities cooperation with Africa and 
with the southern Mediterranean countries. In this regard, Portugal organised 
together with the EU Institute for Security Studies a high-level conference on "ESDP 
and the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa" which sought 
to promote African capabilities as well as the security sector reform dimension of 
ESDP. The Defence Minister of Ghana, the country holding the Presidency of the 
African Union at the time, joined the informal Ministers of Defence Meeting held 
during the Portuguese Presidency. An EU-Africa summit was organised and the EU-
Africa strategic partnership was launched and further detailed through the 2008-
2010 Action Plan which has peace and security as its top priority. In terms of 
operations, the Portuguese Presidency was instrumental in preparing and planning 
two ESDP missions in Africa, one in Chad/RCA and the other in Guinea-Bissau.130 
One of the most interesting innovations of the Portuguese Presidency was the 
organisation of the first joint Council meeting between Ministers of Defence and 
Ministers of Development which identified "initial pragmatic actions for increased 
coherence in some of the areas spanning the security-development nexus: strategic 
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planning, Security Sector Reform, partnerships with regional and sub regional 
organisations, and humanitarian aid and security".131 
Concerning the Mediterranean countries, Portugal sought to encourage "political 
and security engagement with the Mediterranean countries in order to develop and 
deepen the dialogue on ESDP and security issues" and strengthen cooperation in 
areas such as "conflict prevention, partnership building measures and crisis manage-
ment activities, and also military support to civil protection".132 For these purposes, a 
working session was organised during the informal Ministers of Defence meeting of 
September 2007 where the five African countries of the ‘5+5 dialogue’ participated. 
This was seen by Portugal as an important step: for the first time a more restricted 
Euro-Mediterranean meeting was held in order to overcome some of the political 
problems that this dialogue faces at a broader level.133 
Portuguese officials concluded that "we have never seized a Presidency so well".134 
As an advisor to the Minister of Defence stated, Portugal had an "extra and a post 
Presidency agenda", aware that the conduct of the Presidency could have 
subsequent benefits for Portuguese foreign and security policy.135 That is especially 
the case for the five Northern African countries of the ‘5+5 dialogue’ with which 
Portugal is now deepening its bilateral cooperation in the field of defence.  Similarly, 
the Portuguese position within NATO and CPLP has improved after having advanced 
the agenda of these two organisations at the EU level. Relations with some African 
countries, namely Ghana, RD Congo and Angola and with the Africa Union in 
general, were also developed thanks to the work of the Portuguese Presidency.136 
The ESDP mission in Guinea-Bissau is a good example of bottom-up Europeanisation, 
although Portugal is still generally reluctant towards Europeanising its policies vis-à-vis  
Africa. The Presidencies, similarly, represent an institutional mechanism through which 
a country can steer the EU’s activities during six months. The horizon in preparing the 
Presidencies goes well beyond those six months and the Presidency agenda is very 




131 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Security and Development", 
Brussels, 19-20 November  2007. 
132 "ESDP Portuguese Presidency Programme", op.cit. 
133 Interview. 
134 Interview. 
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4. Conclusion: European by Force and by Will 
Given Portugal’s traditional Atlanticist stance, I have tried to explain why and how it 
has supported the ESDP and to what extent, and in which particular domains, 
Portugal has been able to project its security and defence preferences onto the 
European level. Assessing the convergence between Portuguese security policy and 
the ESDP, I looked first at the political discourse justifying Portuguese participation in 
ESDP and at the transformations that the security establishment and the Portuguese 
armed forces underwent as a result, including the contributions to ESDP missions and 
operations. To answer the second part of my question, I focused on Portugal’s ESDP 
engagement in Africa and on the Presidencies of the Council as moments when the 
interactions between the European and national levels are more manifest. 
Portugal’s participation in ESDP has been motivated in part by a reactive posture 
that seeks to avoid marginalisation in European affairs through active participation in 
the inner circles of European integration. Portuguese security policy has tried to 
adapt but political action has not followed the same pro-European pace as political 
discourse due to chronic budgetary difficulties and to a certain lack of consensus on 
the direction of Portuguese security policy. The relatively low contributions in terms of 
capabilities are the result of structural problems of Portuguese defence and not of 
unwillingness to commit more deeply to ESDP. However, some efforts were made in 
terms of increasing investment in equipment procurement and R&D and in switching 
Portugal’s equipment procurement to the European market. By making a EUROFOR-
based Battlegroup available to the EU, Portugal takes an important step in providing 
a more capable force that goes beyond participation in the EUBG only for political 
reasons. 
At the civilian level, Portugal has played an especially active role concerning the 
police capabilities, a domain in which the country is one of the top European 
players. With regard to the remaining dimensions of civilian crisis management 
Portugal has had obvious difficulties. 
In terms of participation in civilian and military ESDP missions, Portugal figures in the 
first half of the contributors, which again shows the political commitment of the 
country. Portugal has participated in all the military operations and even if the 
contributions are not substantial, Portugal has made important contributions in the 
area of strategic airlift. Taking civilian and military operations together, Portugal has 
shown a clear focus on Africa as it has participated in all the missions on that 
continent thus far. While in respect to the military missions Portugal follows a strategy 
of participating in all ESDP military missions, even if sometimes without troops on the 
ground, Portugal is more selective when it comes to the civilian missions, focusing its 
efforts clearly on Africa.  
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Portugal has started to ‘upload’ some of its national preferences in terms of security 
policy to the European level in particular with regard to Africa. The case of EUSSR 
Guinea-Bissau is a paradigmatic case of projection of a national interest to the 
European level. Portugal had taken the political initiative, is the most active 
contributor to the mission and has been lobbying for its continuation. This is clearly a 
case of a member state using the EU as a veil for its national preferences but also of 
using the European level to surmount certain divergences at the bilateral level. 
However, the small scale and limited mandate of the mission show that it is not 
perceived as a real European priority by most of the member states. Concerning the 
EU’s support to African peace and security capabilities, Portugal expresses 
considerable reservations. Although at the political level the willingness to fully 
participate in projects like EURO RECAMP - AMANI AFRICA is expressed, in certain 
sectors of the security and defence establishment there is evident disagreement 
about the Europeanisation of Portuguese activities. 
A common factor of the two presidencies held by Portugal since the launching of 
the ESDP is that they will not go down in history thanks to what was achieved in terms 
of European Security and Defence Policy. However, taking into consideration the 
overall weight of the country for the ESDP, some important measures were taken 
especially with regard to the 2000 Presidency that was held when the ESDP was 
having its first and significant developments. The 2007 Presidency is remarkable for 
the way Portugal was able to conciliate its national interests with European interests. 
This Presidency was indeed portrayed by my interviewees as consensual, but 
Portugal clearly admits it had an ‘extra and post Presidency agenda’. 
Looking at Portugal’s participation in ESDP leads to the conclusion that even small 
member states have a certain scope to influence the policy. The political weight of 
the big member states is undeniable: "big member states are important just because 
they are big!”137 Yet, in a crisis management domain such as the ESDP, not only 
absolute military capabilities, but also political engagement, expertise and niche 
capabilities matter. Coherence of action and active participation in the debates 
were also mentioned as ways for small member states to influence the ESDP 
system.138 
The ESDP will definitely evolve in the near future through structured cooperations. For 
the countries willing to participate, the pre-requisites to be defined will provide 
benchmarks they will have to meet. This will test the real political commitment of 
member states and allow for an increasing convergence between their security 
policies and the ESDP as a whole. For Portugal, structured cooperation will constitute 
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words. The picture is not all gloomy for Portugal since both in terms of objective 
criteria and of political motivation the situation in other member states is worse. But 
Portugal has purposefully been following a ‘multivector’ security strategy by 
participating actively within the UN, NATO, the EU and the CPLP. Portugal is doing its 
best to avoid difficult choices and wishes to be in the frontline of ESDP. For these 
reasons, a further Europeanisation of its security policy is likely to occur. Portugal is 
also aware that its role in ESDP has to be improved by being an active producer of 
international security. This has led mainly to a Europeanisation of crisis management 
through which the ESDP assumes an increasingly important role for Portuguese 
security policy, while NATO and transatlantic relations are still regarded as the 
ultimate guarantee of Portuguese and European defence. 
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